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Income-tax Department
Edited

by

Stephen G. Rusk

The decision of the United States district court of Connecticut, handed
down by District Judge Thomas, December 16, 1920, in the case of Brewster
versus Walsh is causing such widespread interest that it is thought advis
able to publish it in its entirety in The Journal of Accountancy.
Until this decision is upheld by the United States supreme court tax
payers will be expected to make their returns as heretofore, as if the decision
had not been rendered, but it may be advisable to make claims for abatement
of the tax on sale of capital assets pending the final adjudication of this
matter.
The commissioner of internal revenue has addressed a letter to the col
lectors under date of February 10, 1921, in which he states that the bureau
will continue to collect the tax upon gains and profits realized from the
sale of capital assets unless and until the supreme court shall hold that pro
vision of the law unconstitutional.
From the above-mentioned letter it appears that “the same question is
involved in the Eldorado and Ryerson cases which were argued in the
supreme court some weeks ago.” The court has not handed down a decision
in these cases.
Treasury decision No. 3119 contains some interesting information re
garding estate tax under the revenue act of Sept. 8, 1916, applying to trans
fers of property in contemplation of death. It comprehends a decision by
Circuit Judge Knappen in the United States circuit court of appeals, sixth
circuit, in Schwab, Executor, versus Doyle.
The regulations relative to amortization allowances have been revised
and clarified by the department of internal revenue and they are amended
by treasury decision No. 3123.
Some interesting theories are set forth in a decision handed down by
Circuit Judge Knappen in the case of the Nashville, Chattanooga & St.
Louis Railway Company versus United States.
The portion which will be found especially interesting to accountants is
that in which the judge states that “the depreciation which may be deducted
in determining net income is the decrease in intrinsic value due to wear,
tear, decay, obsolescence, etc., of the physical property suffered during the
year as distinguished from the market value.”
This seems to differ from the accepted theory that physical property has
a known period of years of usefulness and that its cost, less salvage value
at end of its usefulness, is the amount that depreciates, and that this depre
ciation may be charged against income in equal annual instalments.
It will be seen, however, in this particular case that there had been testi
mony by “competent witnesses of railway experience” that the “service life
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of any normally operated and normally and well maintained railroad is
perpetual * * *” Hence there may be no conflict between the ruling
in this case and the accepted theory of depreciation.

(Decision)
Revenue act of 1916
Increase in value of capital assets when realized by sale or other dis
position, by one not a trader or dealer therein, is not income, and hence is
not taxable as such.
DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
District of Connecticut
Frederick F. Brewster
vs.
James J. Walsh
Collector of InternalRevenue.

]

No. 2133
AtLaw

THOMAS, DISTRICT JUDGE:
This action arises under the income-tax law of 1916. Plaintiff seeks
to recover of the defendant, who is collector of internal revenue for the
district of Connecticut, $17,689.13, which amount the plaintiff paid to the
government under protest, as an additional income tax assessed against him
for the year ending December 31, 1916. The plaintiff further claims that
there is also due him the additional sum of $67.66 which the government
concedes was an overpayment of normal tax and is rightly due the plaintiff,
so that the total amount claimed by the plaintiff is $17,756.79. Trial by
jury was waived and the case was tried to the court.
The facts were stipulated. It appears that plaintiff is not now nor was
he during the times mentioned herein, a member of any stock exchange, or
of any similar organization or association engaged in the business of trad
ing in, buying or selling securities. Neither was he in any way engaged
in the business of buying or selling stocks and bonds otherwise than oc
casionally making purchases of stocks and bonds for investment purposes,
and occasionally making sales of such stocks and bonds for the purpose of
changing the character of his investments. It further appears that there
are three transactions involved in the main points raised in this suit.
The first transaction concerns the bonds of the International Navigation
Company. In 1899 the plaintiff acquired certain interest-bearing bonds of
that company of the face value of $191,000 in exchange for other securities
of the same corporation, and during the year 1916 he sold the same bonds
for $191,000. On March 1, 1913, these bonds were quoted in the market at
79½% of their face value, so that on that day the market value of the
bonds was $151,845. The tax sought to be collected by the government on
this transaction is based upon the difference between the sale price and
the market price of the bonds on March 1, 1913, to wit: $39,155, which
amount the commissioner taxed as income for the year 1916, and is part
of the tax paid under protest which plaintiff seeks to recover in this suit.
The second transaction concerns certain bonds of the International Mer
cantile Marine Company.. In 1903, plaintiff, as a member of an underwriting
syndicate, was granted an allotment of mortgage bonds of the face value
of $257,000, in return for which he paid the company at that time $231,300
in cash, but the bonds thus allotted were not delivered to the plaintiff until
April, 1906 when he received them with nothing by way of interest on the
amount of cash he had turned over to the company in 1903. The plaintiff
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claims that interest at 6% for three years on $231,300 is properly an element
of cost and attributable thereto.
It becomes necessary at this point to digress from a statement of the
facts and first dispose of plaintiff’s claim for interest on this transaction,
in order to determine what the bonds actually cost the plaintiff, as the actual
cost must be determined before consideration can be given to the plaintiff’s
claims respecting the tax the commissioner assessed and which plaintiff
paid under protest, pursuant to such assessment. Plaintiff’s claim that in
terest computed from date of payment in 1903 to date of receipt of bonds
in 1906, and added to the cash paid for the bonds represents the real cost of
the bonds to the plaintiff is untenable.
In Hays v. Gauley Mountain Coal Co., 247 U. S. 189, one of the ques
tions there presented was whether the respondent should be allowed to add
interest to the amount of cash it had paid in 1902 for certain shares of the
capital stock of another mining company which shares it sold in 1911, but
the supreme court held that there was “no merit in the contention that in
terest should be added to the purchase price in order to ascertain its cost,”
so that I find that the actual cost of these bonds to the plaintiff was $231,300.
From the stipulation it further appears that the plaintiff sold the bonds
in 1916 for $276,150, part of them having been sold at 107⅜ and part at
107½. But on March 1, 1913, the market quotation and market value of
these bonds was 64 bid and 64½ asked and at such quotation had an actual
market value of $164,480. On this transaction the plaintiff failed to make
an income tax return as to any profit or gain by him obtained on the sale
of these bonds and was later assessed an additional tax of $111,670 on the
ground that this was the representative gain shown by the difference be
tween $164,480, the value of said bonds as indicated by the market quota
tion of March 1, 1913, and $276,150, the price which plaintiff received from
the sale of the bonds in 1916. The tax which was assessed on this transac
tion by the commissioner, and paid under protest, and which is part of the
tax here sought to be recovered was levied upon the sum of $111,670, which
amount the government claims represents the income received from the sale
of these bonds and which amount, as stated above, was the difference be
tween the market value of the bonds on March 1, 1913, and the sum re
ceived for them when sold in 1916.
The third transaction relates to a stock dividend declared by the Stand
ard Oil Company of California, in which company the plaintiff owned 1330
shares of its capital stock. In 1916 the plaintiff received 665 shares of
stock of said company as a stock dividend declared against a surplus,—
18.0754% of which had been earned after March 1, 1913. The government
claims that the plaintiff derived $12,019.41 taxable income therefrom, but
this claim has been decided adversely to the government in Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U. S. 180 [¶ 2575], where the identical stock dividend
was under consideration, so that the plaintiff, upon that authority, is en
titled to recover for the tax assessed and collected in connection with this
transaction.
The discussion is therefore narrowed to two transactions,—those per
taining to
The International Navigation Company bonds,
The International Mercantile Marine Company bonds, both of which
the plaintiff owned on and before March 1, 1913, and which he sold in 1916,
in accordance with the conditions above set forth. So that the sole inquiry
here is—whether the difference in the amounts between the value of invest
ment securities on March 1, 1913, and the amounts received for such
securities when sold in 1916 is taxable income within the income-tax law
of 1916? (39 Stat. c. 463, pp. 756, 757.)
The discussion of this proposition revolves around the sixteenth amend
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ment of the constitution and the legislation passed by the congress after
the ratification of the amendment.
The sixteenth amendment to the constitution provides:
“The congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on in
comes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among
the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.”
The pertinent sections of the statute passed by the congress to carry the
amendment into effect provide:
“Sec. 1. (a) That there shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid
annually upon the entire net income received in the preceding calendar year
from all sources by every individual, a citizen or resident of the United
States, a tax of two per centum upon such income.”
“Sec. 2. (b) That, subject only to such exemptions and deduc
tions as are hereinafter allowed, the net income of a taxable person
shall include gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages,
or compensation for personal service of whatever kind and in what
ever form paid, or from professions, vocations, businesses, trade,
commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether real or personal,
growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in real or per
sonal property, also from interest, rent, dividends, securities, or the
transactions of any business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or
profits and income derived from any source whatever: provided, that
the term ‘dividends’ as used in this title shall be held to mean any
distribution made or ordered to be made by a corporation, joint-stock
company, association, or insurance company, out of its earnings or
profits accrued since March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, and
payable to its shareholders, whether in cash or in stock of the corpora
tion, joint-stock company, association, or insurance company, which
stock dividend shall be considered income, to the amount of its cash
value.”

It is thus apparent that the statute specifically imposes a tax upon net
income which “shall include gains, profits, and income derived from . . .
sales or dealings in property,” and then provides:
“(c) For the purpose of ascertaining the gain derived from the
sale or other disposition of property, real, personal, or mixed,
acquired before March first, nineteen hundred and thirteen, the fair
market price or value of such property, as of March first nineteen
hundred and thirteen, shall be the basis for determining the amount
of such gain derived.”
It is the contention of the plaintiff that the statute is unconstitutional in
so far as it taxes as income the increased value of investments when real
ized by sale, and that such a tax is a direct tax upon capital or property not
authorized by the sixteenth amendment and not a tax upon income. In other
words, that such gains do not come within the definition of income as the
word is used in the sixteenth amendment.
On the other hand, it is the contention of the government that such gains
do constitute income properly taxable under the income-tax law of 1916.
We are therefore brought to a consideration of the scope of the sixteenth
amendment, because there is no question but that prior to the adoption of
this amendment the congress had no power whatever to tax as income gains
arising from the sale of property where the owner thereof was not a
dealer or trader in such property so as to justify an excise tax upon his
business.
In support of this, reference is made to the decision of the supreme
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court in Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601. The con
clusion stated by Chief Justice Fuller, on page 637, is as follows:
“Taxes on personal property, or on the income of personal prop
erty, are likewise direct taxes,” and that “the tax imposed by Sections
twenty-seven to thirty-seven, inclusive, of the act of 1894, so far as
it falls on the income of real estate and of personal property, being
a direct tax within the meaning of the constitution, and, therefore,
unconstitutional and void because not apportioned according to repre
sentation, all those sections . . . are necessarily invalid.”
In Eisner v. Macomber, supra—Mr. Justice Pitney, speaking of the
Pollock case, said on page 205:
“It was held that taxes upon rents and profits of real estate and
upon returns from investments of personal property were in effect
direct taxes upon the property from which such income arose, im
posed by reason of ownership; and that congress could not impose
such taxes without apportioning them among the states according to
population, as required by article I, section 2, clause 3, and section
9, clause 4, of the original constitution.”
The sixteenth amendment does not extend the taxing power to new
subjects. In Evans v. Vore, 253 U. S. 245, at page 262 [¶ 2738], Mr. Jus
tice Van Devanter in delivering the opinion of the supreme court said:—
“Thus the genesis and words of the amendment unite in showing
that it does not extend the taxing power to new or excepted subjects,
but merely removes all occasion otherwise existing for an apportion
ment among the states of taxes laid on income, whether derived from
one source or another.”
And again in Eisner v. Macomber, supra, at page 206, Mr. Justice
Pitney, in discussing the scope of the amendment, said:
“As repeatedly held, this did not extend the taxing power to new
subjects, but merely removed the necessity which otherwise might
exist for an apportionment among the states of taxes laid on income.
Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 240 U. S. 1, 17-19; Stanton
v Baltic Mining Co., 240 U. S. 103, 112 et seq.; Peck & Co. v. Lowe,
247 U. S. 165, 172-173.
“A proper regard for its genesis, as well as its very clear language,
requires also that this amendment shall not be extended by loose con
struction, so as to repeal or modify, except as applied to income, those
provisions of the constitution that require an apportionment accord
ing to population for direct taxes upon property, real and personal.
This limitation still has an appropriate, and important function, and
is not to be overridden by congress or disregarded by the courts.
“In order, therefore, that the clauses cited from article I of the
constitution may have proper force and effect, save only as modified
by the amendment, and that the latter also may have proper effect,
it becomes essential to distinguish between what is and what is not ‘in
come,’ as the term is there used; and to apply the distinction, as cases
arise, according to truth and substance, without regard to form.
Congress can not by any definition it may adopt conclude the matter,
since it cannot by legislation alter the constitution, from which alone
it derives its power to legislate, and within whose limitations alone
that power can be lawfully exercised.”
In the case at bar it therefore “becomes essential to distinguish be
tween what is and what is not ‘income’ as the term is used in the sixteenth
amendment . . . and to apply the distinction according to truth and
substance without regard to form,” in order that article I of the original
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constitution, section 2, clause 3, and section 9, clause 4, may have proper
force and effect save only as modified by the sixteenth amendment.
The question therefore is simply this:—Is a gain in value realized from
the sale of property income?
Insisting with great earnestness, with persuasive argument and the
citation of cases alleged to be in support of its argument, the government
contends that the answer is—Yes. The plaintiff, with equal forcefulness,
contends that the answer is—No.
But the cases relied upon by the government arose under the corpora
tion tax act of 1909, and not under the income tax law. The corpora
tion tax act of 1909, as held by the Supreme Court in Stratton’s Independ
ence v. Howbert, 231 U. S. 399, 414, 416, was not an income tax law, and
since gains by sales were specifically included as taxable, the cases decided
under that act do not determine the definition of the word “income” with
in the sixteenth amendment and so are not apposite to the instant case.
Mr. Justice Pitney, in the Stratton’s Independence case, supra, on page
414, said:—
“As has been repeatedly remarked, the corporation tax act of 1909
was not intended to be and is not in any proper sense an income tax
law. This court had decided in the Pollock case that the income
tax law of 1894 amounted in effect to a direct tax upon property, and
was invalid because not apportioned according to population as pre
scribed by the constitution. The act of 1909 avoided this difficulty
by imposing not an income tax, but an excise tax upon the conduct
of business in a corporate capacity, measuring, however, the amount
of tax by the income of the corporation, with certain qualifications
prescribed by the act itself. Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107;
McCoach v. Minehill Co., 228 U. S. 295; United States v. Whitridge
(decided at this term, ante, p. 144).”
And again on page 416 he said:—
“As to what should be deemed ‘income’ within the meaning of
Sec. 38, it of course need not be such an income as would have been
taxable as such, for at that time (the sixteenth amendment not hav
ing been as yet ratified), income was not taxable as such by congress
without apportionment according to population, and this tax was not
so apportioned. Evidently congress adopted the income as the meas
ure of the tax to be imposed with respect to the doing of business in
corporate form because it desired that the excise should be imposed,
approximately at least, with regard to the amount of benefit pre
sumably derived by such corporation from the current operations of
the government. In Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co., 220 U. S. 107, 165, it
was held that congress in exercising the right to tax a legitimate sub
ject of taxation as a franchise or privilege, was not debarred by the
constitution from measuring the taxation by the total income, although
derived in part from property, which, considered by itself, was not
taxable. It was reasonable that congress should fix upon gross in
come, without distinction as to source, as a convenient and sufficiently
accurate index of the importance of the business transacted.”

See also Anderson v. Forty-Two Broadway, 239 U. S. 69, 72; Stanton v.
Baltic Mining Co., 240 U. S. 103, 114; Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Co.,
242 U. S. 503, 522; Doyle v. Mitchell Bros. Co., 247 U. S. 179, 183.
The question before us was passed upon by the supreme court under
the income-tax law of 1867 in Gray v. Darlington, 15 Wallace 63, and this
precise question has not been before the supreme court since that decision.
There it was decided that under the Law of 1867 a gradual increase in
value extending over a period of years could not be taxed as income for
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the year in which it was realized by sale. Speaking for the court, Mr.
Justice Field on page 65 said:—
“The question presented is whether the advance in the Value of
the bonds, during this period of four years, over their cost, realized
by their sale, was subject to taxation as gains, profits, or income of
the. plaintiff for the year in which bonds were sold. The answer
which should be given to this question does not, in our judgment,
admit of any doubt. The advance in the value of property during a
series of years can, in no just sense, be considered the gains, profits,
or income of any one particular year of the series, although the entire
amount of the advance be at one time turned into money by a sale of
the property. The statute looks, with some exceptions, for subjects
of taxation only to annual gains, profits, and income.”
And further on page 66:
“The mere fact that property has advanced in value between the
date of its acquisition and sale does not authorize the imposition of
the tax on the amount of the advance. Mere advance in value in no
sense constitutes the gains, profits, or income specified by the statute.
It constitutes and can be treated merely as increase of capital.”
Respecting this decision, the supreme court in Lynch v. Turrish,
247 U. S. 221 [¶ 2351], speaking by Mr. Justice McKenna, said on
page 230, after discussing Gray v. Darlington:

“This case has not been since questioned or modified,” and meets the gov
ernment’s attempt to distinguish Gray v. Darlington, on page 230, in the
following manner:—
“The government, however, makes its view depend upon disputable
differences between certain words of the two acts. It urges that the
Act of 1913 makes the income taxed one ‘arising or accruing’ in the
preceding calendar year, while the Act of 1867 makes the income one
‘derived.’ Granting that there is a shade of difference between the
words, it cannot be granted that congress made that shade a criterion
of intention and committed the construction of its legislation to the
disputes of purists. Besides, the contention of the government does
not reach the principle of Gray v. Darlington, which is that the grad
ual advance in the value of property during a series of years in no
just sense can be ascribed to a particular year, not therefore as ‘aris
ing or accruing,’ to meet the challenge of the words, in the last one
of the years, as the government contends, and taxable as income for
that year or when turned into cash. Indeed, the case decides that such
advance in value is not income at all, but merely increase of capital
and not subject to a tax as income.”
The meaning of the word “incomes” in the sixteenth amendment is no
broader than its meaning in the act of 1867. It was adopted in its present
form, using only the words “incomes from whatever source derived” with
the presumptive knowledge on the part of congress and the several state
legislatures, of the meaning attributed thereto by the decisions of the vari
ous courts both state and federal.
It has been held repeatedly that gains realized from the sale of capital
assets held in trust are not income, but are principal,—exactly as the
securities were before they were sold, and that where a tenant for life is
entitled to the entire net income of a fund, and the trustee realizes an ad
vance in value by the sale of an investment, the life tenant is not entitled
to the gain which is uniformly treated by the courts as an increment to
principal and a part of the corpus of the trust.
The following are a few of the leading cases sustaining the doctrine
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that the growth or increase of value when realized on the sale of an in
vestment is accretion to capital and not income as between life tenant and
remainderman. Boardman v. Mansfield, 79 Conn. 634; Carpenter v. Perkins,
83 Conn. 11, 20; Parker v. Johnson, 37 N. J. Eq. 366, 368; Outcault v.
Appleby, 36 N. J. Eq. 74, 78; Matter of Gerry, 103 N. Y. 445; Thayer v.
Burr, 201 N. Y. 155, 157, 158; Graham's Estate, 198 Pa. St. 216; Neel’s
Estate (No. 2) 207 Pa. St. 446; Lauman v. Foster, 157 Iowa 275; Slocum
v. Ames, 19 R. I. 401; Jordan v. Jordan, 192 Mass. 337; Mercer v. Buchanan,
132 Fed. 501, 508.
These decisions had at the time of the adoption of the sixteenth amend
ment, established a definite meaning of the word “income” for the purpose
of statutory and constitutional construction. It is difficult to see how the
word “income” can have any different meaning when applied to the pro
ceeds of an investment when held by a trustee, than when held by an
individual, as the income-tax law specifically refers to funds held in trust.
(Sec. 2 (b).)
In order to show the conclusions reached by the courts it will suffice
to quote from only one of the cases to which reference is made supra. In
Parker v. Johnson, 37 N. J. Eq. 366, the court said:
“The profit is not income. It was made by the trustee in the pro
cess of converting the investment, and, like a premium realized on
the sale of government bonds in which the funds might be invested,
it belongs to the fund. The trustee in this case is to keep the fund
invested, and the tenant for life is entitled to the interest. It is clearly
the duty of the trustee to apply the profits on one investment to making
up the losses on others.”
So it seems that income from investments consists,—in the case of
bonds, of interest; in the case of stocks, of dividends. There is no income
from the sale of investments.
The conclusion seems imperative that the word “income” has a welldefined meaning, not only in common speech but also under judicial con
struction and this meaning does not include the increase in value of capital
assets when realized upon a sale.
The following extract from the opinion of Mr. Justice Pitney in the
Macomber case, supra, at page 206, is instructive:
“For the present purpose we require only a clear definition of the
term ‘income’ as used in common speech, in order to determine its
meaning in the amendment.”
It seems to me apparent that the supreme court, in Towne v. Eisner, 245
U. S. 418, 426 [p. 2313], and in Eisner v. Macomber, supra, followed the
doctrine enunciated in Gibbons v. Mahon, 136 U. S. 549, where it was held
that a stock dividend is an accretion to capital and not income as between
a life tenant and the remainderman and therefore held in the Towne case
that a stock dividend was not income within the meaning of the income-tax
law of 1913 and in the Macomber case that a stock dividend was not in
come within the meaning of the sixteenth amendment. As already stated,
it is difficult to see why any different rule should be applied to the proceeds
of an investment—purely a capital investment—when held by a trustee than
when held by an individual.
Two pertinent points have been definitely established by the supreme
court in Eisner v. Macomber, supra, page 214:
First:—“Enrichment through increase in value of capital invest
ment is not income in any proper meaning of the term.”
and
Second:—If it requires conversion of capital in order to pay the
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tax, it must follow that the tax is on capital increase and not on
income, for on page 213, the court said:—
“Yet without selling, the shareholder, unless possessed of other
resources, has not the wherewithal to pay an income tax upon the
dividend stock. Nothing could more clearly show that to tax a stock
dividend is to tax a capital increase, and not income, than this demon
stration that in the nature of things it requires conversion of capital
in order to pay the tax.”
Had the plaintiff possessed no resources other than the bonds which he
sold,—prior to the sale his capital would have been their then entire value.
The increase since March 1, 1913, was capital increase. To collect the tax
on this increase in value because the capital was converted into cash must
of necessity diminish his capital to that extent. Before the sale all the
plaintiff possessed was capital without any part of it constituting income.
The sale of capital results only in changing its form and like the mere
issue of a stock dividend, makes the recipient no richer than before. Gibbons
v. Mahon, supra; Towne v. Eisner, supra; Eisner v. Macomber, supra.
The exact question presented in this case has not been before the supreme
court since its decision in Gray v. Darlington, supra, nor did it arise in
Eisner v. Macomber, supra. Notwithstanding certain passages in the opin
ion of the court in the Macomber case stating that when dividend stock is
sold at a profit, the profit is taxable like other income,—which I consider,
in view of all that has been written by the supreme court in a long line of
income tax decisions, must mean that the profit derived from such transac
tions, if it is income, applies in the case of a trader and not in the case of
an individual who merely changes his investments.
Therefore, under the authority of Gray v. Darlington, which is approved
in Lynch v. Turrish, supra, I feel constrained to hold that the appreciation
in value of the plaintiff’s bonds, even though realized by sale, is not in
come taxable as such, and in reaching this conclusion I find support for it
in the Macomber case where Mr. Justice Pitney says:
“Enrichment through increase in value of capital investment is not
income in any proper meaning of the term.”
It follows that the income-tax law of 1916, in so far as it attempts to
tax such increase, is in conflict with the apportionment requirements of
the first article of the constitution, being a direct tax and not apportioned
among the several states according to population.
Counsel for plaintiff contended that the act should be so construed as to
limit the tax to the actual increase from the dates of acquisition, although
the value of such bonds was less on March 1, 1913, than when acquired
prior thereto, in the event that the gain in value of the bonds when sold
was taxable at all. In view of the decision that such increases are not in
come it becomes unnecessary to discuss the point.
The conclusion herein expressed has been reached only after a very
careful consideration of all the respective claims presented by able coun
sel in exhaustive and persuasive briefs and with full appreciation of the
admonition given by the supreme court in Nicol v. Ames, 173 U. S. 509,
at page 514. This court fully appreciates that
“It is always an exceedingly grave and delicate duty to decide upon
the constitutionality of an act of the congress of the United States.”
and that
“the duty imposed demands in its discharge the utmost deliberation
and care and invokes the deepest sense of responsibility”—
as was said by Chief Justice Fuller in the opening paragraph of the opin
ion in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U. S. 601, at page 617.
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In the discharge of that duty, as I see it, it follows that the word “incomes”
in the sixteenth amendment should not and cannot be so construed as to
include property other than income even if such property is described as
income by an act of congress, as such a construction permits the congress
to nullify the provisions of the second section of article I of the constitu
tion, that direct taxes shall be apportioned.
Let judgment be entered for the plaintiff to recover of the defendant
$17,756.79, together with interest on the same from July 19, 1918, together
with costs of suit.
Ordered accordingly.
(T. D. 3115, January 12, 1921)
Treasury certificates of indebtedness
Instructions relative to acceptance of treasury certificates of indebtedness
for income and profits taxes, supplementing articles 1731 and 1732, reg
ulations No. 45 (revised), and superseding T. D. 2973.
1. Collectors of internal revenue are authorized and directed to receive
at par United States treasury certificates of indebtedness, series TM-1921,
dated March 15, 1920, series TM 2-1921, dated July 15, 1920, series TM
3-1921, dated September 15, 1920, and series TM 4-1921, dated October 15,
1920, all maturing March 15, 1921, in payment of income and profits taxes
payable on March 15, 1921. Collectors are authorized and directed to re
ceive at par treasury certificates of indebtedness of series TJ-1921, dated
June 15, 1920, and series TJ 2-1921, dated December 15, 1920, both matur
ing June 15, 1921, in payment of income and profits taxes payable on June
15, 1921; treasury certificates of indebtedness of series TS-1921, dated
September 15, 1920, maturing September 15, 1921, in payment of income
and profits taxes payable on September 15, 1921, and treasury certificates
of indebtedness of series TD-1921, dated December 15, 1920, maturing
December 15, 1921, in payment of income and profits taxes, payable on
December 15, 1921. Collectors are further authorized and directed to re
ceive at par, in payment of income and profits taxes payable at the maturity
of the certificates, respectively, treasury certificates of indebtedness of any
other series which may be issued maturing on March 15, June 15, Septem
ber 15, or December 15, 1921, respectively, and expressed to be acceptable
in payment of income and profits taxes. Collectors are not authorized
hereunder to receive in payment of income or profits taxes any treasury
certificates of indebtedness not expressed to be acceptable in payment of
income and profits taxes, nor any treasury certificates maturing on a date
other than the date on which the taxes are payable. Collectors are author
ized to receive treasury certificates of indebtedness which are acceptable
as herein provided in payment of income and profits taxes, in advance of
the respective dates on which the certificates mature. Treasury certificates
acceptable in payment of income and profits taxes have one or more in
terest coupons attached, including as to each series a coupon payable at the
maturity of the certificates, but all interest coupons must in each case be
detached by the taxpayer before presentation to the collector, and collected
in ordinary course when due. The amount, at, par, of the treasury cer
tificates of indebtedness presented by any taxpayer in payment of income
and profits taxes must not exceed the amount of the taxes to be paid by him,
and collectors shall in no case pay interest on the certificates or accept them
for an amount other or greater than their face value.
2. Deposits of treasury certificates of indebtedness received in pay
ment of income and profits taxes must be made by collectors, unless other
wise specifically instructed by the secretary of the treasury, with the fed
eral reserve bank of the district in which the collector’s head office is located,
or in case such head office is located in the same city with a branch fed
eral reserve bank, with such branch federal reserve bank. Specific instruc
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tions may be given to collectors by the secretary of the treasury in certain
instances for the deposit of the certificates with federal reserve banks of
other districts and branch federal reserve banks. The term “federal reserve
bank,” where it appears herein, unless otherwise indicated by the context,
includes branch federal reserve banks. Treasury certificates accepted by
the collector prior to the dates when the certificates respectively mature
should be forwarded by the collector to the federal reserve bank, to be held
for account of the collector until the date of maturity and for deposit on
such date.
3. Collectors of internal revenue are not authorized, unless express in
structions otherwise are given by the secretary of the treasury, to receive
in payment of income or profits taxes interim receipts issued by federal
reserve banks in lieu of definite certificates of the series herein described,
4. Certificates of indebtedness should in all cases be indelibly stamped
on the face thereof as follows by the collector, and when so stamped should
be delivered to the federal reserve bank in person if the collector is located
in the same city, and in all other cases forwarded by registered mail
uninsured:
......................................, 192...
This certificate has been accepted in payment of income and profits taxes,
and will not be redeemed by the United States except for credit of the
undersigned.

Collector of Internal Revenue
for the.................... District of......................
5. Collectors should make in tabular form a schedule in duplicate of
the certificates of indebtedness to be forwarded to the federal reserve bank,
showing the serial number of each certificate, the date of issue and maturity,
with serial designation, and face value. Certificates of indebtedness ac
cepted prior to the date of maturity must be scheduled separately. At the
bottom of each schedule there should be written or stamped “Income and
profits taxes $.............. ” which amount must agree with the total shown
on the schedule. One copy of this schedule must accompany certificates
sent to the federal reserve bank, and the other be retained by the collector.
The income and profits tax deposits resulting from the deposits of such
certificates must in all cases be shown on the face of the certificate of de
posit (national bank form 15) separate and distinct from the item of mis
cellaneous internal-revenue collections (formerly called ordinary). Until
certificates of deposit are received from the federal reserve banks, the
amounts represented by the certificates of indebtedness forwarded for de
posit must be carried by collectors as cash on hand, and not credited as
collections, as the dates of certificates of deposit determine the dates of
collections.
6. For the purpose of saving taxpayers the expense of transmitting
such certificates as are held in federal reserve cities or federal reserve
branch bank cities to the office of the collector in whose district the taxes
are payable, taxpayers desiring to pay income and profits taxes by such
treasury certificates of indebtedness acceptable in payment of taxes should
communicate with the collector of the district in which the taxes are pay
able and request from him authority to deposit such certificates with the
federal reserve bank in the city in which the certificates are held. Col
lectors are authorized to permit deposits of treasury certificates of in
debtedness in any federal reserve bank with the distinct understanding that
the federal reserve bank is to issue a certificate of deposit in the collector’s
name covering the amount of the certificates of indebtedness at par and to
state on the face of the certificate of deposit that the amount represented
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thereby is in payment of income and profits taxes. The federal reserve
bank should forward the original certificate of deposit to the treasurer of
the United States with its daily transcript, and transmit to the collector
the duplicate and triplicate, accompanied by a statement giving the name
of the taxpayer for whom the payment is made, in order that the collector
may make the necessary record and forward the duplicate to the office of
the commissioner of internal revenue.
7. This treasury decision amends and supplements the provisions of
article 1731 and 1732 of regulations No. 45 (revised), and supersedes
T. D. 2973.
(T. D. 3119, January 17, 1921)
Estate tax—Act of September 8, 1916—Decision of court
1. Estate tax—Transfer in contemplation of death—Retroactive
OPERATION OF ACT.

The act of September 8, 1916, title II, applies to all transfers in con
templation of death, whether made before or after the passage of the act,
provided the transferrer’s death occurred after the act took effect.
2. Same—Act of September 8, 1916—Constitutionality.
>The act of September 8, 1916, title II, construed as applying to trans
fers made in contemplation of death before its passage, where the trans
ferrer died after the act took effect, is not unconstitutional.
3. Same—"In Contemplation of Death" defined.
By the term “in contemplation of death,” as used in section 202 of the
act of September 8, 1916, and applied to a gift inter vivos, is not meant on
the one hand the general expectancy of death which is entertained by all
persons, nor, on the other, is the meaning of the term necessarily limited
to an expectancy of immediate death or a dying condition. Nor is it
necessary, in order to constitute a transfer in contemplation of death, that
the conveyance or transfer be made while death is imminent, or immed
iately impending by reason of ill health, disease, injury or like physical
conditions. But a transfer may be said to be made in contemplation of
death if the expectancy or anticipation of death in either the immediate
or reasonably near future is the moving cause of the transfer.
4. Estate tax—Transfer in contemplation of death—Evidence.
The decedent on April 22, 1915, made a deed absolute in form conveying
personal property worth about $1,000,000 in trust with no reservations in
her .favor. She died September 16, 1916, of apoplexy, primarily resulting
from hardening of the arteries. She was a childless widow and had lived
for many years in the family of a sister whose husband, and ultimately
whose children, were the beneficiaries of the deed of trust. On May 26,
1915, the decedent made her will and in it referred to the disposition of her
estate and to the wills made at the same time by her sister and brotherin-law. Held, that it was clear, in the light of the evidence presented, that
a question of fact was presented for the jury’s determination.
5. Same—Transfer in contemplation of death—Presumption.
It was not error to charge that, in determining the issue of fact whether
the transfer was made in contemplation of death, there might be taken into
account the presumption afforded by the prima facie clause of section 202
(b) of the act, which provides that “Any transfer of a material part of his
property in the nature of a final disposition or distribution thereof, made by
the decedent within two years prior to his death without such a considera
tion (namely, a fair consideration in money or money’s worth) shall, unless
shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in contemplation of
death * * *."
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6. Same—Transfer in contemplation of death—Conclusion of
witness.
It is incompetent for a witness to state a fact which is for the ultimate
conclusion of the jury; in the present instance, whether a testatrix had
any expectancy that she was in danger of passing away in the near future.
7. Evidence—Hearsay.
Testimony of a witness that he understood that decedent, her sister, and
the latter’s husband made their wills together so as not to excite decedent,
was properly excluded; witness plainly having no first-hand knowledge of
the matter.
8. Same—Objection to competency—Time.
Where no exception was taken to overruling of objection to testimony
on ground that it was immaterial, and the witness then testified without
objection, a subsequent objection, on the question being substantially re
peated to the same witness, but without statement of the grounds of asserted
incompetency, and without motion to strike out the testimony already given,
came too late.
The appended decision, dated December 10, 1920, of the United States
circuit court of appeals, sixth circuit, in the case of Victor E. Shwab,
executor, v. Doyle, collector, is published for the information of internal
revenue officers and others concerned.

United States circuit court of appeals, sixth circuit
Victor E. Shwab, executor ,plaintiff in error, v. Emanuel J. Doyle, collector
internal revenue, defendant in error
Error to the district court of the United States for the western district
of Michigan
Submitted June 11, 1920. Decided December 10, 1920
Before Knappen, Denison, and Donahue, circuit judges
Knappen, circuit judge: Suit by plaintiff in error to recover an estate
tax paid under protest.
On April 22, 1915, decedent made to the Detroit Trust Co. a deed ab
solute in form, conveying personal property worth about $1,000,000 in trust,
for the payment of both interest and principal to certain beneficiaries, with
no reservation in favor of the grantor. The conveyance took immediate
effect, and was accompanied by delivery of the property conveyed. It was
purely voluntary and without momentary consideration. Decedent died
September 16, 1916, possessed of a remaining estate of about $800,000, upon
which a tax was assessed and paid upon return by the executor under title
II of the revenue act of September 8, 1916 (39 Stat., ch. 463; U. S. Comp.
Stat., 1916, sec. 6336½), which took effect seven days before decedent’s death,
viz, September 9, 1916. That tax is not involved here, nor is its validity
questioned. The tax here in question was assessed under section 202 of the
same act, as upon a transfer made in contemplation of death. Plaintiff con
tended below and contends here (1) that the act was not intended to reach
absolute conveyances in contemplation of death made before the passage
of the act; (2) that if so intended it is unconstitutional; (3) that there was
no substantial evidence that the transfer was “in contemplation of death”
within the meaning of the statute. The trial court denied plaintiff’s motion
for a direct verdict, held the statute valid and applicable to the trust
deed, if made in contemplation of death, and submitted to the jury the
question whether it was so made. There were verdict and judgment for
defendant.
1. Was the act intended to apply to transfers made before its passage?
Section 202 includes in the taxable value of a decedent’s estate (a) prop
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erty held by the decedent at the time of his death and subject thereafter
to the payment of debts and expenses of administration, and to distribu
tion as part of his estate; (b) property “of which decedent has at any time
made a transfer or with respect to which he has created a trust, in con
templation of or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after his death, except in case of a bona fide sale for a fair consideration
in money or money’s worth;” (c) property held jointly or as tenants in the
entirety by decedent and any other person.
It will be observed that the transfers mentioned in subdivision (b) are
of two classes—those made “in contemplation of death” and those “intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after” death. We are con
cerned with the first only of these classifications.
In our opinion the statute evidences an intent on the part of congress
that the tax should apply to all transfers in contemplation of death, whether
made before or after the passage of the act, provided the transferrer’s death
occur after the act took effect. This intent is, we think, evidenced by a
variety of considerations.
(a) Section 201 imposes a tax upon the transfer of the net estate of
“every person dying after the passage of this act.” In section 202 the tax
able estate of the decedent embraces all transfers of the two classes already
mentioned which the decedent has “at any time made.” The remaining
paragraph of section 202 (b) not already set out declares that “any transfer
of a material part of his property in the nature of a final disposition or dis
tribution thereof made by the decedent within two years prior to his death
without such a consideration (a fair consideration in money or money’s
worth) shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been made
in contemplation of death within the meaning of this title.” The italicized
words in each of the foregoing quotations indicate, on their face, an all
embracing intent, and are thus prima facie opposed to a limitation to trans
fers made after the passage of the act.
(b) The evident theory of the statute is that transfers intended to take
effect after the death of the grantor, as well as those made in contemplation
of death, are equally testamentary in character.—Rosenthal v. People (211
Ill., 306, 309) ; Keeney v. New York (222 U. S., 525, 536). Such classifica
tion is within the power of congress. The theory of taxation on account of
transfers testamentary in character is that death is the generating source
of the tax.—Knowlton v. Moore (178 U. S., 41, 56); Cahen v. Brewster
(203 U. S., 543, 550). A transfer is accordingly taxed only at the death
of the transferrer, no matter how long the transfer may precede death.
Congress has accordingly included the two classes of transfers in one and
the same section and subjected them, so far as terms go, to precisely the
same treatment. In our opinion a transfer intended to take effect in posses
sion or enjoyment after the grantor’s death would under this statute be
taxable, although made before the passage of the act.—Wright v. Blakeslee
(101 U. S., 174, 176). The natural inference would be, in the absence of
substantial evidence to the country, that the same result was intended as
to transfers made in contemplation of death.
(c) While the interests derived by a grantee under an absolute and im
mediately effective conveyance in contemplation of death are vested, the
same is true of any irrevocable conveyance which takes effect in possession
or enjoyment only upon the death of the grantor, although in the latter
case such vesting is merely in expectancy. If congress had power, as we
think it had, to tax both classes of conveyances, even if made before the
passage of the act, no good reason suggests itself why it should desire to
discriminate between the two classes of transfers.
It is not to our minds unnatural, nor is it necessarily unjust, that con
gress should intend that one taking a conveyance of a testamentary char
acter, entirely without consideration, should do so at the risk of having the
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transfer taxed, directly or indirectly, as would be the case were the trans
fer by will or by conveyance taking effect at or after the grantor’s death.
Under this statute, however, the remaining estate of the decedent, both in
case of a transfer intended to take effect at the grantor’s death and in the
case of a transfer made in contemplation of death (as well as in the case of
transfers by will) is made primarily liable for the tax, and it is only when
the estate proves insufficient for the purpose that resort may be had, under
section 209, to the personal responsibility of the transferee or to the property
transferred, and even then a right of action over is given to the transferee.
We find in the language of section 209—“If a decedent makes a transfer of
or creates a trust with respect to, etc.”—nothing which we think inconsistent
with the construction of the act which we find disclosed by section 202 and
by the other considerations to which we have called attention. Section 209
pertains merely to the remedy for the collection of the tax.
(d) Congress has not been averse to imposing taxation for a period
preceding the passage of the taxing act. This has been ordinary practice
with respect to income taxes. Indeed, the revenue act of September 8,
1916, here in question, provided for taxation of income accruing during the
entire year beginning January 1, 1916. While in that case less than a year
had elapsed, the distinction from the case presented here is one of degree
and not of principle. The present income tax act, however, passed February
24, 1919 (40 Stat., ch. 18), imposed taxation for the year 1918, then wholly
passed.
It is true that if the tax before us is retroactive it might, at least theo
retically, affect conveyance made many years before a grantor’s death, but
this consideration is hardly practical. Congress would, we think, scarcely
be impressed with a practical likelihood that a transfer made many years be
fore a grantor’s death (say 25 years, to use plaintiff’s suggestion) would be
judicially found to be made in contemplation of death under the legal defini
tion applicable thereto, and without the aid of the two years’ prima facie
provision. The considerations which we have enumerated not only out
weigh in our opinion those opposed thereto, but we think clearly, positively,
and imperatively demand that the act be construed as intended to apply to
transfers of the class here in question, although made before the act was
passed, provided the death of the transferrer occurs thereafter.
2. Is the statute unconstitutional as applied to the trust deed? In our
opinion the act, if so construed, is not void as denying due process of law
or as violating the fifth amendment to the constitution.—Billings v. United
States (232 U. S., 261, 282-3); Brushaber v. Union Pacific R. R. Co. (240
U. S., 1, 23, 24). Nor do we think the tax is to be classified as a direct tax,
and thus void as within the constitutional requirement of apportionment.
It is clearly an excise or duty tax.—Scholey v. Rew. (23 Wall., 331) ;
Knowlton v. Moore, supra (at p. 78); Flint v. Stone-Tracy Co. (220 U. S.,
107, 159) ; Keeney v. New York, supra (at p. 537). Without enumerating
every objection suggested against the validity of the tax, we think it enough
to say that in our opinion its validity must depend upon whether or not it
can be said to interfere with vested rights. As regards this consideration,
we may set to one side the interests of the beneficiaries under the trust deed.
Not only are they not complaining, but no tax has been assessed against
their interests. No interest, invested or uninvested, on their part is proposed
to be or can be taken under the statute and the existing facts, for not only
is decedent’s remaining estate able to pay the tax, but it has already paid it.
Decedent’s estate alone, and those interested therein under her will, must
bear the burden. It is settled law that one attacking a statute as unconstitu
tional must show that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures him.—
Southern Ry. v. King (217 U. S., 524, 534) ; Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsyl
vania (232 U. S., 531, 544-5).
As to plaintiff’s interest: assuming that he is entitled to raise the ques-
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tion, we think the statute not invalid because applying to transfers made be
fore its passage. It does not affect transfers made after the transferrer’s
death. Being within the all-embracing power of Congress over the subject
of excise and transfer taxation, it is not necessarily unconstitutional merely
because retroactive.—Cooley on Taxation (3d ed., pp. 492-494) ; Billings v.
United States (232 U. S., 261, 282), where the validity of the 1909 tonnage
act on the use of foreign-built yachts was assailed as retroactive; Brushaber
v. Union Pacific R. R. Co. (240 U. S., 1, 20), which involved the validity of
the income tax of 1913 as against a similar objection; Stockdale v. Insur
ance Co. (20 Wall., 323, 331, et seq.), which involved the income tax law
of 1867. True, none of the cases referred to is on all fours with the instant
case, but we think the principles they announce are decisive. Decedent’s
death being the generating source of the taxation and the statute validly
classifying it as of testamentary character, it logically follows, in our
opinion, that it is valid to impose at decedent’s death a tax on the testa
mentary transfer occurring before the passage of the act, regardless of the
fact that title had already passed to the transferees. In Cahen v. Brewster,
supra (pp. 549 et seq.) a statute imposing an inheritance tax was sustained
as to legatees of decedents dying prior to its enactment, but whose estates
were still undistributed. This case is not without a certain amount of
analogy; nor is there any controlling difference in principle between the as
sessment of a tax upon a previous testamentary transfer and the imposition
of an income tax after the period covered thereby has wholly or in large
part passed; nor—considering that death is the generating source of estate
taxation—between an estate tax upon a transfer created by will and one
upon a transfer created by testamentary deed, merely because in the one case
a right of revocation existed while in the other it is absent, or because one
took effect before and the other after the death of the transferrer.
This conclusion makes it unnecessary to consider the correctness of the
construction put upon the act by the trial judge, which distinguished be
tween the “net estate” burdened by the tax, viz., that which remained at de
cedent’s death, and the net estate resulting from a gross estate which in
cludes, for purposes of measurement, property previously transferred.
Plaintiff urges that in including in the revenue act of 1918 (40 Stat.,
1057, 1097), the words “whether such transfer is made or occurred before
or after the passage of this act,” congress indicated an understanding that
the act here in question was not intended to so provide. We think it, how
ever, the more reasonable inference that the amendment of 1918 was made
to elucidate without changing of the law, and put at rest any controversy on
the subject.—Johnson v. So. Pacific R. R. Co. 196 U. S., 1, 20, 21) ; United
States v. Coulby [D. C.] (251 Fed., 982, 985-6; affirmed, C. C. A., 6 (258
Fed., 27).
3. Meaning of the phrase “in contemplation of death.”—Plaintiff asked
an instruction that “the words ‘in contemplation of death’ do not refer to
that general expectation of death which every mortal entertains, but rather
the apprehension which arises from some existing condition of body or
some impending peril.” This request was refused, and the jury instructed
that “by the term ‘in contemplation of death’ is not meant on the one hand
the general expectancy of death which is entertained by all persons, for
every person knows that he must die * * *. On the other hand, the mean
ing of the term is not necessarily limited to an expectancy of immediate
death or a dying condition * * *. The term ‘in contemplation of death’
involves something between these two extremes. Nor is it necessary, in
order to constitute a transfer in contemplation of death, that the conveyance
or transfer be made while death is imminent, while it is immediately im
pending by reason of bodily conditions—ill-health, disease, or injury, or
something of that kind. But a transfer may be said to be made in con
templation of death if the expectation or anticipation of death in either the
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immediate or reasonably distant future is the moving cause of the transfer.”
It may be conceded that plaintiff’s requested instruction would have been
proper as applied to a gift claimed to have been made causa mortis—when
the grantor was in a dying condition. But the instant case presented no
such issue or claim. The transfer in question was an absolute gift inter
vivos, claimed by the government to have been testamentary in character.
On principle, and without present reference to authority, the ultimate
question concerns the motive which actuated the grantor; that is to say,
whether or not a specific anticipation or expectation of her own health, im
mediate or near at hand (as distinguished from the general and universal
expectation of death some time), was the immediately moving cause of the
transfer. Both the element of “existing condition of body,” as dis
tinguished from the grantor’s mental state on that subject, and the term
“impending,” are inconsistent with the prima facie provision of section 202
(b), which we have set out in paragraph (a) of the first division of this
opinion.
Plaintiff’s contention also overlooks the contribution which may be
made to the grantor’s state of mind and motive by a realization of the
fact that she had already lived many years beyond the scriptural limit.
Of course, the grantor’s bodily health especially as known to her, was an
important factor in ascertaining her state of mind and determining the
ultimate question whether she was directly actuated by a “contemplation
of death.” Upon principle we think the court’s instruction correct.
Nor do we think the trial court’s definition in conflict with any settled
and controlling rule of construction. No federal decision directly in point
is cited. Plaintiff relies on the decisions of the courts of New York,
Illinois, Wisconsin, and California, construing similar statutes antedating
the federal act (that of New York—1892—being the first in point of time),
not only as authority for the construction for which he contends, but as
raising a presumption that congress adopted the construction put by the
highest courts of those States upon their statutes.
In our opinion, the decisions relied on by plaintiff do not completely
or uniformly support his definition. The New York decisions are not con
vincing. In the matter of Seaman (147 N. Y., 69) [1895], the expression
“in contemplation of death” was said in effect to be confined to conveyances
causa mortis. While this statement was obiter, it seems to have been re
flected in some at least of the subsequent decisions of the New York
courts; and while the proposition above cited was definitely rejected in
In re Dee’s estate (148 N. Y. Supp., 423), affirmed 1914 (210 N. Y., 625),
and conveyances inter vivos held to be embraced within the phrase “in con
templation of death,” it would not be natural that the decisions meanwhile
construing that phrase should be more or less influenced by such earlier
classifications. For instance, in the matter of Spaulding’s estate (63 N. Y.
Supp., 694), affirmed (163 N. Y., 607), the decision was substantially rested
on the ground of lack of evidence that the conveyance was made when the
grantor was in extremis or that it was made to avoid the estate tax. In
the matter of Mahlstedt’s estate (73 N. Y. Supp., 818, 820)—decided before
the statute had been definitely held to apply to gifts inter vivos—the essen
tial question was said to be whether the transfer “was made in the then be
lief that he was not going to get well; that it was made in contemplation of
his impending death and for the purpose of defrauding the State of the
transfer tax.” Manifestly, the question of intent to evade has no pertinency
to the case of a purely testamentary conveyance into vivos.—Rosenthal v.
People (211 Ill., App. 308, 309). As showing the lack of the settled con
struction in New York contended for by plaintiffs, it is significant that in
the Crary case (64 N. Y. Supp., 566, 568) the statute was defined as said
to be “intended to reach absolute transfer of property when made under
a certain condition, viz, when the transferrer was contemplating death; that
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is, the thought of death has taken so firm a hold on his mind as to control
and dictate his actions regarding his property, and the business is transacted
while contemplating death, and considering what conditions would arise or
exist in the event of death without making the transfer or, to be more
specific, the contemplation of death is the sole motive and cause of the
transfer.” The state of mind of the grantor was, at least impliedly, recog
nized as the ultimate test (p. 569).
The Illinois decisions fall short of supporting plaintiff’s definition. In
Rosenthal v. People (211 Ill., 306, 309) the only definition of “in contem
plation of death” is this: “A gift is made in contemplation of an event
when it is made in expectation of that event and having it in view, and
a gift made when the donor is looking forward to his death as impending,
and in view of that event, is within the language of the statute.” The
second half of the quotation presumably relates to the application to the
statute of the facts of the case.—Merrifield v. People 212 Ill., 400) con
tains no definition of the term we are considering. The same is true of
People v. Kelly (218 Ill., 509, 515). There a question of fact was alone
involved, the court finding no evidence tending to show that the transferrer
“thought he was about to die at the time he executed said trust deed, or that
he made said trust deed in contemplation of his death.” In in re estate of
Benton (234 Ill., 366, 370), the definition given in Rosenthal v. People was
cited with approval. The court, after citing both the Rosenthal and Kelly
cases, said: “Under the law as established by the foregoing decisions the
question at issue is whether the gift was made in expectation of death, and
a purpose on the part of the donor to place his estate, or some part
thereof, in the hands of those whom he desired to enjoy it after his death.”
It is true that in People v. Carpenter (264 Ill., 400, 408), the court, citing
the Rosenthal and Benton cases, remarked: “Of course, the words ‘in
contemplation of death’ as used in these statutes do not mean that general
expectation of all rational mortals that they will die some time, but it means
an apprehension of death which arises from some existing infirmity or
impending peril.” But not only do the Rosenthal and Benton cases fall
short of fully sustaining that definition as an exclusive one, but the language
we have quoted was purely obiter, as no claim was made that the trust
agreements were executed “in view of death,” and the decision in the trial
court, as expressly stated in the opinion of the supreme court, did not
rest on that ground (p. 408).
Nor do the Wisconsin cases support plaintiff’s contention. In State v.
Pabst (139 Wis., 561, 590), it is said that the words “in contemplation of
death” are “evidently intended to refer to an expectation of death which
arises from such a bodily or mental condition as prompts persons to dispose
of their property and bestow it upon those whom they regard as entitled
to their bounty;"
and again, “A transfer valid as a gift inter vivos, if made
under circumstances which impress it with the distinguishing characteristics
of being prompted by an apprehension of impending death, occasioned by
a bodily or mental state which has a basis for the apprehension that death
is imminent, would be a transfer made in contemplation of death within
the meaning of the law.” True, in State v. Thompson (154 Wis., 320,
328-9), the court cited with approval the holding in the Pabst case, which
we have already quoted; the quotation which we give in the margin from
In re Baker's estate1 (82 N. Y. Supp., 390-2 (affirmed 178 N. Y., 575),
also decided before the New York statute had been authoritatively held to
include gifts inter vivos), and the holding in People v. Burkhalter (247
Ill., 600, 604), that “contemplation of death must be the impelling motive
for making the gift in order that it be subject to an inheritance tax.” The
1 This court has held that the words “in contemplation of death” do not refer to
that general expectation which every mortal entertains, but rather the apprehension
which arises from some existing condition of body or some impending peril.
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definitions given in these various citations are not uniform or entirely con
sistent. Moreover, the decision of the Thompson case seems to have
turned at the last on the question whether the grantor’s age “was so great
when the gifts in question were made as to establish the fact that they
were made in contemplation of death.”
The California decisions are not especially pertinent, for the reason
that the California statute contains a definition of the term “in contempla
tion of death.”—Estate of Reynolds (169 Calif., 600) ; Kelly v. Woolsey
(17,7 Calif., 325) ; Abstract Co. v. State (178 Calif., 691, 694) ; Spreckles v.
California (30 Calif. App., 363, 369) ; McDougale v. Wulzen (34 Calif.
App., 21); In re Minor's estate (180 Pac., 813). It is enough to say of
these decisions (a) that they are not authority for the definition contended
for by plaintiff; (b) that they specifically reject the New York definition,
based upon the confusion between gifts causa mortis and conveyances inter
vivos.—Estate of Reynolds supra (p. 603).
Criticism is made upon the expression “reasonably distant future,” con
tained in the extract from the charge which we print in the margin.2 It is,
we think, not open to question that had the word “close” instead of
“distant” been used the instruction would have been proper, so far as
concerns imminency. That the trial court regarded the words as
equivalent, or intended to use the words “reasonably close,” appears from
his opinion announced immediately before instructing the jury, in which
the words “reasonably close” were used. While “close” and “distant” are
frequently directly opposed to each other, yet when used as here they are
not necessarily opposed. A time which is only reasonably distant is
reasonably close. There was nothing in the exception to the definition
as made which would call the trial court’s attention to a proposition that
the word “close” should have been used instead of “distant,” especially
since there had been also an exception given to the court’s announced
intention to charge a “reasonably close” future.—Norfolk & Western Ry.
Co. v. Earnest (229 U. S., 114, 119-20). Had the court’s attention been
called to the use of the word “distant,” instead of “close” doubtless any
question of difference between the two would readily have been obviated.
4. The sufficiency of the evidence.—The motion to direct verdict was
properly overruled if there was substantial testimony tending to support
a conclusion that the conveyence was made in contemplation of death,
even though the testimony would have supported a contrary conclusion,
as it doubtless would. We can not weigh the testimony. In our
opinion there was substantial testimony, and as it must be considered in
its aspect most favorable to defendant, we so state it, omitting for the
most part specific mention of the considerations relied on by plaintiff where
not as matter of law decisive.
Decedent was about 77 years of age when the trust deed was made.
She had rheumatism of the knee and was subject to frequent attacks of
constipation, a condition said to have a tendency in elderly people to
autointoxication. She had arteriosclerosis, which according to the medical
testimony is usually fatal, and she died of apoplexy, a medical attendant
testifying that in his judgment the apoplexy and death primarily resulted
from hardening of the arteries, secondarily from age. She was a child
less widow and had lived most of the time for many years in the family
of a sister who was a paralytic and who was the wife of Mr. Shwab,
who was one of the beneficiaries in the deed of trust, the executor of
decedent’s will and her business partner. Mr. Shwab had sole charge and
management of the business, which was carried on at Nashville, Tenn.,
where Mr. Shwab and his family resided. During his life he was to
2 “But a transfer may be said to be made in contemplation of death if the expecta
tion or anticipation of death in either the immediate or reasonably distant future is the
moving cause of the transfer.”
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receive the entire income from the trust estate. He was given the right
to require sale of the trust securities to be made from time to time and
select substitutes therefor, and to have accountings made to him by the
trustees. After his death the income was to be divided among six of the
children of Mr. and Mrs. Shwab, subject to letting in a seventh child on
the failure of issue of any of the other six. There were other provisions
not important here.
The trust deed contains an express recital of decedent’s desire “to make
a division of the part of her estate particularly described herein”—words
naturally importing a testamentary conveyance. On May 26, 1915, slightly
more than a month after the trust deed was executed, decedent, her sister
and Mr. Shwab made their respective wills. Decedent’s will, after making
comparatively small bequests to the sister and her children, and providing
for a continuance of the business after her death, at the option of Mr.
Shwab, gives the latter absolutely the bulk of her estate, the will stating
that “he and his wife, my sister Emma, and I have considered the dis
position of our estates and agreed as to what under all the circumstances
will be best for those for whom it is our desire to provide. * * * My
sister will understand why I have bequeathed nothing to her. She has an
abundance and well knows my affection for her, and that I have in con
templation that form of disposition of my estate which eventually will
benefit those she loves so dearly”—referring to her sister’s children. Con
sidering the recitals we have quoted from the trust deed and decedent’s
will, and taking into account all the attendant circumstances, it was open
to inference by the jury that the deed was intended by decedent as part and
parcel of one and the same general testamentary disposition. In 1914
decedent purchased a summer home in Michigan and became at that time
a resident of that state. She continued to live in her sister’s family except
during the summer. While there was testimony tending to show that
decedent’s motive in making the trust deed was merely to avoid Tennessee
taxation, the jury was not bound under the evidence to so conclude,
especially in view of the fact that she had never been called upon to pay
taxes upon her securities in Tennessee, and that she was in fact a resident
of Michigan when the trust deed was made. The record contains, and
counsel have discussed, a variety of considerations affecting the question
of motive and the broader question whether the trust deed was made in
contemplation of death. We think it clear that the evidence presented a
question of fact for the jury’s determination.
5. The instruction that the “presumption” afforded by the prima facie
clause of section 202 (b), which is referred to in subdivision (a) of the
first division of this opinion, could be taken into account in determining
the fact of “contemplation of death” was not erroneous.—R. R. Co. v.
Landrigan (191 U. S., 461, 473-4). The provision in question raises a
presumption of fact, not a presumption of law and under well-settled
rules a presumption of fact may be taken into account determining the
ultimate fact. The presumption is merely a rule of evidence whose enact
ment is within the legislative competency.—Mobile, etc., R. R. Co. v.
Turnipseed (219 U. S., 35, 42). The very object of a presumption of fact
is to supply the place of facts.—Lincoln v. French (105 U. S., 614, 617).
Of course, a presumption can never be allowed against ascertained and
established facts. But unless the statutory presumption may properly be
taken into account in determining the ultimate fact, it has no office.
Elements which, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, are made
sufficient to conclusively establish the ultimate fact, can not be said to
have no evidentiary influence in reaching that conclusion.
6. Admission and exclusion of evidence.—We find no reversible error
in either of the respects complained of. The witness Spicer was not
shown competent to answer the question put to him. It was plainly in
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competent for Mr. Shwab to state a fact which was for the ultimate con
clusion of the jury, viz: whether Mrs. Dickel had any expectation that she
was in danger of passing away in the near future. It was also plainly
incompetent for the witness Hager to testify that he understood that
Mrs. Shwab, Mr. Shwab, and Mrs. Dickel made their wills together “so
that they would not excite Mrs. Shwab.” He apparently had no first
hand knowledge of the matter. As to the inquiry of Mr. Shwab, on crossexamination, respecting the inclusion in Mrs. Dickel’s income-tax return
of the first year’s income under the trust deed, the court had already held
that the income tax returns were not admissible. The question asked Mr.
Shwab regarding the making of such return was objected to only as
“immaterial.” No exception was taken to the overruling of the objection.
The subject was, in our opinion, material. He then testified, without
objection, that the first year’s income from the trust estate was included
in that income tax return as part of Mrs. Dickel’s income. It was only
after the question had been substantially repeated that it was objected to
as “incompetent, immaterial, and irrelevant,” but without statement of the
ground of the asserted incompetency, and without motion to strike out the
testimony already given. The objection was overruled, and the answer
was substantially the same as before. The witness then testified at some
length in explanation of an asserted mistake in making such inclusion. It
is unnecessary, in our opinion, to determine whether the testimony in
question was, for any reason, incompetent, for we think the objection on
that score came too late. We do not intimate an opinion that it was
incompetent. It was material to show that neither Mr. Shwab nor Mrs.
Dickel had paid any taxes in Tennessee, or were liable to be required to
so pay, in view of the fact that such liability had been put forward by
plaintiff’s counsel as the reason for making the trust deed in question.
Finding no error in the record, the judgment of the district court must
be affirmed.
(T. D. 3123, January 28, 1921)
Income tax—Amortization allowance.
Revenue act of 1918—Amendment of articles 181, 182, 183, 184, 185 and 188
of Regulations No. 45, articles 186 and 187 remaining unchanged
and a new article numbered 189 inserted.
Articles 181,182, 183, 184, 185 and 188 of regulations No. 45 are hereby
amended to read as follows, articles 186 and 187 remaining unchanged and
a new article 189 being inserted;
Art. 181. Scope of provisions for amortization.—All allowances made
to a taxpayer by a contracting department of the government, or by any
other contractor, for amortization or fall in the value of property, whether
such allowances were made as a part of the price of the product or in
settlement of claims arising out of the cancellation or termination of con
tracts, shall be included in gross income. All payments arising out of the
settlement of such claims shall be included in the accrued income of the
taxable year in which such cancellation or termination (whether formal or
informal) occurred. The amount of amortization to be allowed as a
deduction from gross income, for the purpose of the tax, shall be com
puted in accordance with the provisions of articles 181 to 189, pursuant to
which the deduction must be made, and not upon the basis of any amounts
contractually or otherwise determined.
Art. 182. Depreciation of amortized property.—The allowance for
amortization shall be inclusive of all depreciation during the amortization
period on property subject to amortization (see art 186), Depreciation
will be allowed, beginning at the close of the. amortization period, upon
property the cost of which has been partly amortized. Depreciation on
partly amortized property shall be based on the value of such property
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after the amortization allowance has been deducted. Property which has
been amortized to its scrap value shall not further be subject to deprecia
tion.
Art. 183. Property cost of which may be amortized.—The taxpayer
may deduct from gross income a reasonable allowance for amortization;
such deduction not to be in excess of the cost of buildings, machinery,
equipment, or other facilities constructed, erected, installed, or acquired on
or after April 6, 1917, for the production of articles contributing to the
prosecution of the present war, or of vessels constructed or acquired on
or after such date for the transportation of articles or men contributing to
the prosecution of the present war.
In the case of property the construction, erection, installation or ac
quisition of which was commenced before April 6, 1917, and completed
subsequent to that date, amortization will be allowed with respect only to
that part of the cost incurred on or after April 6, 1917, and which was
properly entered on the books of the taxpayer on or after that date.
Art. 184. Cost which may be amortized.—The total amount subject to
amortization shall be the difference between the original cost of the prop
erty if constructed, erected, installed, or acquired on or after April 6, 1917;
or if acquired partly before and partly after April 6, 1917, then that part
of the cost incurred on or after April 6, 1917, and properly entered on the
books of the taxpayers on or after that date, less any amounts deducted
for depreciation, losses, etc., prior to January 1, 1918, and the value of the
property on either of the bases indicated below:
(1) In the case of property useful to the taxpayer only during the
period of its operation as a war facility, and which has been sold or
permanently discarded, or which will be sold or permanently discarded
within three years after the termination of the war; the value shall be the
actual sale price or estimated fair market value as of date when the
property was or will be permanently discarded, such fair market value to
be reestablished at and as of the time of the investigation by engineers of
the bureau of internal revenue.
(2) In the case of property not included in (1) above, the value shall
be the estimated value to the taxpayer in terms of its actual use or em
ployment in his going business; such values to be not less than the sale
or salvage value of the property: Provided, however, That for the pur
poses of returns made in 1919, the preliminary estimate of the amount of
such amortization shall not, in any case, have exceeded 25 per cent of the
cost of the property. In the determination, by engineers of the bureau of
internal revenue, of the proper amortization allowance, the estimated
value to the taxpayer of the property in terms of its actual use or employ
ment in his going business, shall be as of the time of such determination.
In the final determination the amount of the amortization allowance will
be ascertained upon the basis of stable post-war conditions under regu
lations to be promulgated when these conditions become apparent.
Special record of all property falling in (1) above, must be preserved
by the taxpayer, and the commissioner must be promptly notified (a), if
after having been in good faith permanently discarded or dismantled,
property shall in any case be restored to use because of conditions not
foreseen or anticipated at the time it was discarded; or (b) of the selling
price, if sold.
Art. 185. Amortization period.—The amortization allowance shall be
spread in proportion to the net income (computed without benefit of the
amortization allowance) between January 1, 1918 (or if the property was
acquired subsequent to that date, January 1 of the year in which acquired),
and either of the following dates:
(a) If the claim is based on (1) of article 184, the date when the
property was or will be sold or permanently discarded as a war facility;
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or (b) if the claim is based on (2) of article 184, the actual or estimated
date of cessation of operation as a war facility.
All taxpayers claiming an allowance for amortization shall compute
(or, to the extent that accurate computations can not be made, shall
estimate) the amount of their net income for the period between January
1, 1918, and the dates specified above, and shall also compute (or estimate
as above) that part thereof properly assignable to each of the calendar
years falling within the amortization period; and the amount of income so
computed or estimated shall be the basis for apportioning the amounts
of amortization applicable to each of the calendar years affected. Tax
payers reporting on the fiscal year hasis shall (a) in all computations based
upon 1918 rates for fiscal years ending in 1918 and 1919 use the amount
of such allowance apportioned to the calendar year 1918; (b) in all com
putations based upon 1919 rates for a year beginning in 1918 and ending
in 1919 use the amount of such allowance apportioned to the calendar year
1919; and (c) in all computations for subsequent fiscal years use the
number of twelfths of the allowance apportioned to each calendar year
falling within such fiscal year that there are months of such calendar year
falling within such fiscal year.
Art. 186. To remain unchanged.
Art. 187. To remain unchanged.
Art. 188. Sale of amortized property.—In the case of the bona fide
sale of amortized property before three years from the termination of the
war, the sale price thereof will be considered as reflecting the correctness
or incorrectness of the amortization allowance made, due allowance being
made for depreciation sustained since the close of the amortization period.
Art. 189. Information to be furnished by the taxpayer.—The tax
payer’s claim for amortization must be complete and comprehensive in all
respects. The commissioner will not entertain claims which do not clearly
set forth full data with respect to the property which it is desired to
amortize.
To assist the taxpayer in compiling this information the commissioner
has prepared guide form 1007-M, which explains in detail the manner in
which claims for amortization should be presented. A copy of this guide
form will be furnished to the taxpayer upon application to the commis
sioner.
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